The Orkar Failed coup of April 22, 1990

The Orkar Failed Coup of April 22, 1990
Part 2
By Nowa Omoigui, MD, MPH, FACC
GENERAL ABACHA's BROADCAST
After the radio station in Lagos was regained by
loyal troops, there was a brief announcement by Lt.
Col. GT Zidon followed by the following broadcast
by Lt. Gen. Sani Abacha:
"I, Lieutenant-General Sani Abacha, Chief of Army
Staff, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, have found it
necessary to address you once again in the course
of our nation's history. In view of the unfortunate,
development early this morning, I'm in touch with
the CGS, Service Chiefs, GOCs, FOCs, AOCs, of the
armed forces and they have all pledged their
unflinching support and loyalty to the federal
military government of General Ibrahim Badamasi
Babangida who is perfectly safe and with whom I
am in contact.

"Early this morning there was sporadic firing by a
few disloyal and misguided soldiers in some
isolated parts of Lagos, followed by an
embarrassing radio broadcast.
"Fellow Nigerians, you will all agree with me that
the reasons given for this grave misconduct are
significantly motivated by greed and self-interest.
The soldiers involved decided to constitute
themselves into national security nuisance for no
other cause than base avarice.'
'Most of these disloyal elements have been
arrested and are already undergoing interrogation.
The remaining dissidents are advised in their own
interest to report to the nearest military location
and hand over the arms and ammunition in their
possession. All formation and unit commanders
are hereby directed to exercise effective command
and control. "At this stage, let me reiterate our
commitment to pursue vigorously the transition
programme. No amount of threat or blackmail will
detract the federal military government's attention
in this regard. We are set to hand over power to a
democratically elected government in 1992. I wish
to assure all law-abiding citizens that the situation
is now under control and people should go about
pursuing their lawful interest.
"Long live the Federal Republic of Nigeria.
"Thank you."
______________________
GENERAL BABANGIDA'S BROADCAST
A broadcast was also made by President
Babangida:
"Fellow Nigerians, I salute you all, first and
foremost, let me assure you further that the
unfortunate situation of this morning in some parts
of Lagos has been brought under control by loyal
troops as earlier stated by the chief of army staff
and chairman, joint chiefs of staff, Lieutenant-
General Sani Abacha with whom I have been in
contact and he is with me this evening.
"I also want to seize this opportunity to commend
all members of the Nigerian armed forces the
Nigeria police and security agents for the gallant
and professional manner the situation was
contained.
"Let me also congratulate the civil populace for
their continued support for this administration. I
wish to state that all law-abiding citizens should
go about their normal duties and their safety
guaranteed. Let me also assure the diplomatic
community and all foreigners in the country that
the security of their lives and property is hereby
guaranteed.
Long live the Federal Republic of Nigeria.
Thank you for your co-operation."
________________________
ESCAPE FROM RADIO NIGERIA
Isolated and surrounded, with the coup clearly
headed for failure, the most senior officers involved,
Lt. Col Nyiam and Major Saliba Mukoro initially
contemplated a suicide pact, but then escaped from
the radio station and eventually left the country for
exile in Britain and the US respectively.
Great Ogboru, the civilian alleged to be a key co-
factor, also slipped out of the country to Europe.
Mukoro later became an Associate Professor of
Criminal Justice at a University in the U.S. Security
agents detained and hounded those elements of
their respective families left behind. But
unconfirmed reports later suggested that on Major
Mukoro's wife simply walked away from supposed
house arrest at Ikeja cantonment in Lagos and
found her way abroad. Great Ogboru's brother
was jailed and it is said that even after fully serving
his jail term, General Abacha refused to release
him.
How did Mukoro and Nyiam escape from Radio
Nigeria?
According to Col. Nyiam, in a 2000 interview with
the Guardian: "At the point of battle when we had,
as it were, allowed all soldiers loyal to us to
engage, we decided that we would walk like officers
out of that zone with the resolve that it will be
better to be shot standing than crawling. And we
walked, there was no disguise. How we walked out
of the encirclement is what I called the mystery and
I give that glory to where it belongs....I will say that
when we left the zone of the conflict itself between
1.00 and 2.00 a.m., here again we give credit to the
poor Nigerians around the shore of the new third
mainland bridge.
There were a lot of poor people who lived there,
who lived in the shanties. Those people
immediately created a force to ferry anybody
involved in the action across the water to the other
side and I must say that when we got there they
were so generous that even in the heat of it all
when they were giving us water to drink, they felt
that their water was too dirty for me to drink and
they went and bought mineral - that shows you the
generousity of the poor.
They felt we were too good to drink their water so
they gave us soft drink. It was these same poor
people who became our scout and helped us to
walk through Isale Eko and thereafter when we got
to a point on the old Carter Bridge, we asked them
to go back and we walked on foot. Again, there
were soldiers, how they did not see us - that credit
goes to God. In cases where soldiers, the police
and other forces saw us, they ignored us and even
helped us to go through. In effect, people should not
be over critical of the police or disown soldiers
because many of them have been suffering from the
same problems average people go through. In
summary, the mystery and experience of this body
and mind talking to you and Mukoro is only but a
demonstration of God's power."
COURTS-MARTIAL
Major Gideon Gwaza Orkar was arrested along with
about 300 other military personnel and more than
30 civilians. In the usual Nigerian pattern of mass
arrests and reactive witch hunting, some journalists
considered unsympathetic to the regime were also
detained and newspapers even closed.
Following a Board of Inquiry, cases were referred to
a Military Tribunal chaired by Major General Ike
Omar Sanda Nwachukwu. The Chief Prosecutor
was Brigadier General Tunde Olurin while Lt. Col.
Akin Kejawa led the defence.
In July 1990, Major GG Orkar and 41 others were
convicted for treason and executed by firing squad
after confirmation of sentences by the Armed
Forces Ruling Council (AFRC). Nine other
defendants were jailed while 31 soldiers were
acquitted.
Following a serious controversy inspired by
allegations made by some of the convicts - as they
were about to be shot - that those acquitted by the
first tribunal were fellow putschists acquitted on
ethnic grounds, the AFRC ordered the retrial of 31 of
the surviving accused by a new tribunal headed by
Major General Yohanna Yerima Kure. The Chief
prosecutor this time around was Lt. Col. Kemi
Peters while Lt Col JOJ Okolagwu led the defence.
In September 1990, therefore, a second batch of 27
executions was carried out.
It has been said that the core Bendel (Edo/Delta)
and Rivers (Rivers/Bayelsa) plotters were not
remorseful about the rebellion. Captain Empere in
particular was very defiant and identified the late
Isaac Adaka Boro as his mentor and hero. He and
others were driven by deeply held feelings that
although their exploited lands produced Nigeria's
oil wealth, their people had little to show for it. It is
fair to categorize the rebellion, therefore, as a
"resource control uprising".
__________________'
SOME ADDITIONAL BIOSKETCHES
Major GG Orkar
Major Gideon Gwaza Orkar was Tiv from Benue
State. He started his officer cadet training at the
NDA in 1972 with the 12th Regular Combatant
Course.
He was commissioned in December 1974 in the
rank of Second Lieutenant and posted to the
Nigerian Army Armoured Corps School in Ibadan.
He did particularly well on the Armour Young
Officers course and was later sent for some
specialized courses in gunnery. Indeed he was
recognized as a gunnery expert by his colleagues.
There is an unconfirmed story that as a subaltern,
he was once granted six months seniority over his
colleagues based on outstanding performance
representing his commanding officer back in the
seventies.
As a junior officer he also attended several courses
in the Nigerian Army School of Infantry. He was on
the first Nigerian contingent that was sent to Chad
Republic and he later served in the 22 Armoured
Brigade.
He passed both the junior and senior divisions of
Staff College with flying colours.
His last posting was as a member of the Directing
Staff of the Command and Staff College.
Major GG Orkar was said to have been recruited
into the plot just a few weeks before April 22, 1990.
_____________________
Lt. Col Gabriel Anthony Nyiam
GA Nyiam attended primary school in Lagos before
going to the Nigerian Military School in Zaria. He
subsequently attended the Nigerian Defence
Academy as part of the 9th Regular Combatant
Course, beginning in January 1971.
Upon completion of his program at NDA he was
inducted into the Corp of Engineers. He attended
Earthwork University in Edinburgh and undertook a
second degree at the University of Aberdeen,
Scotland. During this period he was seconded to
the British Army, where he says he imbibed the
culture that "soldiering is an honourable profession
in the defence of the weak".
When he returned to Nigeria he joined General
Babangida's staff at the AHQ. He was a staff officer
at the AHQ until just before the putsch when he
was posted to the Commmand and Staff College at
Jaji as a Directing Staff.
___________________
Lt. Col UK Bello
Lt Col Usman K Bello was an indigene of Niger
State. Gwari by tribe, he started his Officer Cadet
training with the 9th Regular Combatant Course in
January 1971 at the Nigerian Defence Academy
Kaduna. He was commissioned in the rank of
Second Lieutenant in June 1973 and posted to the
Recce Regiment.
He attended several courses in the Nigerian Army
School of Infantry and some Armour officers'
courses in Britain and the United States.
He was ADC to Brigadier SM Yar Adua when the
latter was Chief of Staff Supreme Headquarters. He
was also the Brigade Major 24 Armoured Brigade
before he proceeded to the Command and Staff
College (CSC) for his Senior Division Course. At
CSC he did very well and came first in order of
merit.
Bello was not a university graduate but he put all
his energy into making a career of the army. His
last posting before being deployed to Dodan
Barracks was as the CO of the Recce Battalion in
Kaduna. As a Lt Col, he replaced Major MS Dasuki
as ADC to President Babangida. Even as ADC he
sought permission to undergo airborne training in
the Nigerian Army School of Infantry. This was not
a normal practice for one at his age and rank
Bello commanded tremendous amount of respect
from all ranks. The President had a lot of
confidence in him.
________________________
R EFLECTIONS ON THE UPRISING BY LT. COL. GA
NYIAM
(For full details, see Guardian and Vanguard
newspapers dated April 15 & 16, 2000)
What was the objective of the April 1990 rebellion?
According to Lt. Col. G Anthony Nyiam, who was
the most senior officer involved in the uprising (but
not the leader), the aim was "to have a caretaker
government with a view to do two things at that
time. One was to do a proper national census and a
proper election and also set up a framework for a
national conference."
In an interview with the Sunday Vanguard
Newspaper published on April 16, 2000, Nyiam
also said "With that in mind, we never had any
idea that we were going to govern anybody. It was
just to restore power to the people. That is to
restore democracy. Our aim was that there was
going to be a caretaker committee which was going
to be headed by a former minister under President
Shagari."
How did Nyiam get involved?
Nyiam volunteered information that he was
recruited into the conspiracy in February 1990
"when some junior officers approached me to
express their discontentment with the
system...Because, I did not completely trust them, I
did not give any word whether I would support the
plan or not. Instead, I started to watch them. I
watched them for about one month to see if they
were serious or the intention was to set me up.
These were young officers who really meant
business because they were full of zeal. Because of
their enthusiasm and anger, they were anxious that
the coup be carried out almost with dispatch. But, I
continually urged restraint as what they wanted
would not have given room for much planning.
Eventually, we came in to try to reorganize and look
at things, how we could do it better. But, along the
line, the action leaked. We had envisaged the
possibility of a leakage and had, as a result of that,
put in place contingency plan so that we would not
be arrested like General Mamman Vatsa and co."
How did the plot leak?
"The details of the contingency plan was that we
would move if the coup plot leaked. And true to
what we thought, several days before action was to
be carried out, our intelligence reports indicated that
the plan had leaked. This obviously forced us to
immediately take up arms." He went on: "In fact,
another senior officer, a mate of mine who was the
link between the young officers and myself,
eventually sold out, that is, he was the source of
the leakage. When we realised that our plans had
leaked, that led to the pre-emptive action we took. I
remember we took our action without any arm, it
was in that night that our resources were got by
first of all taking over Apapa."
Why was the so called "Far" North excised from
Nigeria?
On the question about the excision of some far
northern states, Nyiam said: "If you read our
speech (on the coup), you will find out that our
position was based on the presumption that the
then Sultan was imposed on the people of Sokoto
and that the act was the beginning of the
destruction of the traditional institution. The act
ostensibly destroyed the Sokoto caliphate by
causing division between the two houses. It was on
the basis of this that we said that state would not
be re-absorbed (if we had succeeded in taking over
government) into the country until that traditional
stool had been restored to the proper person. If you
read the conditionalities, you are likely to discover
that what we were saying was that sultanate would
not have fitted into the new order that we
envisaged. We did not see the action as a coup but
as an uprising, to correct some anomalies."
But in a separate interview with the Sunday
Guardian newspaper, Nyiam was also reported as
having 'defended the coup broadcast in which some
states in the far North were exercised from the
country, saying he is more convinced now that the
action was proper. He said: "We saw it coming
[excision]. After the Mamman Vatsa's coup attempt,
I travelled with Abacha within the country to meet
traditional rulers and Army Commanders to speak
to soldiers. Anytime we went to the Hausa areas in
the North, we were given Hausa and Islamic regalia
and if you didn't wear it, they would not be happy
with you. It got to a stage that if you were in the
Army, you have to speak Hausa. What I am saying
in effect was that, there was a gradual acculturation
of other people who have superior culture." '
What was Nyiam's relationship with General
Babangida?
Nyiam was reported (by the Sunday Guardian) to
have admitted being an "IBB boy". The newspaper
said: 'The former military president, he added,
commissioned him to work on a diarchy based on
Egypt's Abdel Nasser model where the military,
produced the president while the civilians produced
the prime minister. Explaining that it was part of
the self-succession agenda of Babangida and the
late Abacha, he said that being so close to
Babangida, he had access to privileged information
which showed that the former military president
was not at all in a hurry to quit the political stage
except by an uprising.'
Further, Nyiam, explaining his initial attraction to
the former President, also stated that: "In a
nutshell, we all came in to help Babangida whom
we thought was a man who meant well. If one goes
back to his earlier contribution, he was doing very
well and we all gave him our support. But then,
when we saw the things that were coming up;
things like the way people from the South were
being maginalised, in NNPC; how Ebitu Ukiwe was
thrown out of power to make room for Abacha, and
a host of other things that happened. It was also at
this period that the OIC thing started. All these put
together made one reason that one cannot just be
an officer in name and watch his people being
marginalised or being made victims or killed. At the
time also, Dele Giwa was murdered."
___________________________
CONSEQUENCES OF THE APRIL REVOLT
Like all failed coups before it, the April 1990 coup
led to certain reactive (i.e. witch hunting) measures
by the military against the services, units or corps
that were thought to have been deeply involved in
it. Military Police Battalions were downsized. A
similar phenomenon occurred after the Vatsa
conspiracy. However, this angle is outside the
scope of this article.
In his seminal work "The Federal Republic of
Nigerian Army", Major General Mohammed Alli,
former Chief of Army Staff, who as a Colonel in
Kano had dissociated himself and his Brigade from
the coup, described the Mukoro/Orkar et al coup as
one "imbued with undue radicalism."
He opined that in execution, the revolt "suffered
communication disconnection" (whatever that
means) but that it had nevertheless "shaken the
nation and the northern hegemony to their very
foundation and fabric." Alli says that the 1990
coup, "like its predecessor in 1966" opened "a
more precarious and frightening chapter, pointing to
and crying for fundamental changes in the nation's
political structure and the basis of existence and
control of the Armed Forces." However, "as soon
as it was subdued and suppressed, the nation went
back to business as usual."
One obvious consequence to civilians was the
acceleration of the movement of the federal capital
from Lagos to Abuja in 1990 by the Head of State,
General Ibrahim Babangida. It was also reported
by some pundits that he was rattled by the
experience and lost a considerable amount of self-
confidence for quite some time. This temporary
newfound humility extended to some of his
apologists but it was also mixed with passive-
aggressive behaviors driven by fear and insecurity.
The failure of the coup, however, marked the
beginning of the rise of Lt. Gen. Sani Abacha who
was now increasingly being referred to in the Press
as the Khalifa (successor). Whatever anyone said
of him, few could doubt his ferocity and deliberate
calm under conditions of extreme danger that befell
him on April 22. He had proved his mettle. As
former Panamanian dictator General Noriega once
said: "The ultimate sign of virility is the ability to
hold on to power."
It was widely acknowledged that Abacha could
quite easily have taken power for himself if he
wanted - although he was not highly thought of by
so called 'IBB boys'. Clearly, Babangida owed him
plenty and became increasingly beholden to his
attitudes - particularly since there was some
discussion of the merits and demerits of
Babangida's abandonment of Dodan Barracks -
albeit involuntarily.
Another officer who benefited from the failure of the
April rebellion was Brigadier Ishaya Bamaiyi of the
9th Brigade. He was rewarded with the Command
of the Brigade of Guards and it marked the
beginning of his eventual ascendancy into the
rarified atmosphere of service chiefs. It is also
possible that Major General Chris Alli's eventual
emergence as the first Chief of Army Staff under
General Abacha may have been influenced by the
standing he gained with the "caucus" during this
coup attempt.
According to Kunle Amuwo, who carried out a
research project on General Babangida's "personal
rulership" project, the 1990 rebellion, coming as it
did in the setting of Babangida's "permanent
transition" undermined his credibility and may have
been a factor in the way the public reacted to the
deaths of over 150 middle grade officers in a
subsequent C-130 plane crash in 1992. Amuwo
holds the opinion that 'Even though Babangida
lamented that "a whole generation of young officers
(mainly Majors) has been wiped out" by the air
crash, the public thought his government may have
had a hand in it.
During their trials, Major Gideon Orkar and his men
reportedly told the military tribunal that their coup
was in three layers; that unless all young officers
were killed, there was no hiding place for the
regime. Over 160 officers perished in the crash.
That the public tended to give credence to this story
is, itself, a measure of lack of trust in the General
as his "tenure" dragged to an end.' The public's
reaction to the gutting by a suspicious fire of the
Ministry of Defence building in 1993 followed
similar lines.
But there were other consequences. Although most
people dismissed the so called conditional
expulsion of the "far" north as a silly gamble,
according to Professor Julius Ihonvbere, the coup
forced certain "deep-rooted" conflicts and "critical
issues" to the front page of the national discourse.
Never too distant from national institutional
memory anyway, right from the days of the 1957
Willink Commission report, the Ifeajuna/Nzeogwu
insurrection of January 15, 1966, the Isaac Boro
"Niger-Delta" rebellion, the Petroleum and Land
Use Acts, these were to play out in later years as
the Ogoni crisis, small concessions by Babangida
on the 'onshore-offshore' issue, creation of
OMPADEC, June 12 imbroglio, and more recent
undercurrents of the "Sovereign National
Conference", "Power Shift", "Resource Control",
"Federalism", and "Sharia" polemics.
There are observers who say that these fault lines
in Nigerian politics portend an inevitable
earthquake. I prefer the nuanced Chinese
interpretation (as was once observed by the late
President Kennedy) - that every crisis presents both
danger and opportunity.
CASUALTIES OF THE REBELLION
A full accounting of the dead and injured from the
April 1990 rebellion is not yet possible, in part
because of the secretive nature of events
surrounding the incident. However, it is widely
assumed to be the bloodiest attempt to seize power
in the history of Nigeria.
EXECUTED (incomplete list)
Major Gideon Gwaza Orkar
Captain N Harley Empere
Captain Perebo A Dakolo
Capt AA Nonju
Lt. AE Akogun
Lt. CN Odey
Lt. Cyril O Ozualor
Lt. NEO Deji
2/Lt AB Umukoro
2/Lt EJ Ejesuku
SSgt Julius Itua
Sgt Martins Ademokhai
Sgt. Pius Ilegar
WO2 Monday Bayefa
L/Cpl Francis Ogo
L/Cpl Jepta Inesei
Cpl. Sunday Effiong
L/Cpl Sam Mbakwe
L/Cpl Albert Ojerangbe
L/Cpl Godfrey Deesiiyira
L/Cpl Emma Oyemolan
Sgt. Stephen Iyeke
Cpl. Joseph Efe
WO Afolabi Moses
L/Cpl Idowu Azeez
WO Jonathan Ekini
S/Sgt Solomon Okungbowa
Private Richard Iseghoei
Private Egwolo Makpamekun
L/Cpl Edogamen Friday
S/Sgt Jolly Agbodowi
Sgt. Etim Umoh
L/Cpl Sam Obasuyi
Ex. Serviceman LC Otajareiri
Ex. Pvt Osazuwa Osifo
Ex. Pvt CP Wasiu Lawal
Ex. Pvt Peter Unuyoma
Ex. Pvt Synalman Goodluck Emefe
Ex. S/Sgt Samson Idegere
Pvt. Emmanuel Onoje
Trooper Roland Odogu
Corporal Lateef Awolola
Pvt. Dickson Omenka
Corp Ehietan Pius
Private Iroabuchi Anyalewechi
Private Henry Eguaoyi
L/Cpl Martins Odey
L/Cpl Sunday Asuquo
Trooper Celestine Ofuoku
Pvt. Anthony Korie
Pvt Thomas Angor
Pvt Edem Basi
Pvt Joseph Odey
Trooper Obioma Esiworo
L/C Magnus Ekechi
WO2 Godwin Donkon
Sgt. Ojo Adegboyega
Pvt Peter Abua
Pvt. Phillip Akamkpo
Sgt. Shehu Onleje
Corp Olanrewaju Ogunshola
L/Cpl Luka Yang
Trooper Malkily Ayogu
L/Cpl Andrew Onah
Michael Ebeku
OTHERS (At least 69 were officially executed, so
this
list is incomplete)
************************
KILLED DURING FIGHTING
Lt. Col. UK Bello (General Babangida's ADC)
Lt. killed during altercation at Ikeja cantonment
gate
3 - 5 soldiers at Ikeja
Captain Charles Idele (Idele was one of the coup
leaders. He was Military Assistant to the
Commandant, School of Infantry, Jaji. He left Jaji
and came to Lagos to partake in the coup. His
corpse was reportedly found wearing the uniform of
a Major on the grounds outside Ikeja cantonment
gate where he was shot by loyal troops. )
OTHERS (numbers unknown, from fighting at Dodan
Barracks, Obalende and the Radio Station)
************************
JAILED
L/Cpl Ezekiel Akudu
Pvt Ibrahim Egwa
Sgt. John Alilu
Sgt. Andarich Eladon
L/Cpl David Amo Amo
L/Cpl Vitalis Udzea
************************
DISMISSED
L/Cpl Celestine Nebo
L/Cpl Wapami Adigio
L/Cpl Mike Odeniyi
L/Cpl Kingsley Aromeh
Sgt. Lawrence Ademola
Signal Man Fatai Daranijo
Pvt. Godwin Airomokha
Sgt. John Benson
L/Cpl Vincent Ozigbo
L/Cpl David Oke
********************
RETIRED OR DISCHARGED FROM THE MILITARY
An unknown number of soldiers and officers were
discharged or retired from the military in a
subsequent purge. The highest ranking of these
was a Brigadier (from Bendel) who held the office
of Director of Army Staff Duties and Plans. His
career ended by virtue of the fact that Major Saliba
Mukoro (widely presumed to be the leader of the
rebellion) was his Military Assistant. The Brigadier
was never charged, never found guilty of
involvement, and was even reportedly involved in
putting down the revolt. But in the Byzantine world
of dog eat dog military politics; the so-called
"caucus" organized his departure from the Army.
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